Mercer Law Review
Volume 55
Number 1 Annual Survey of Georgia Law

Article 9

12-2003

Education Law
Jerry A. Lumley

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Education Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Lumley, Jerry A. (2003) "Education Law," Mercer Law Review: Vol. 55 : No. 1 , Article 9.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol55/iss1/9

This Survey Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

Education Law
by Jerry A. Lumley*
While the 2003 session of the Georgia General Assembly did not
produce as much legislation in the area of school law as in years past,
significant school legislation was signed into law by Governor Perdue in
2003. Additionally, Georgia's appellate courts issued several important
decisions in this area. This Article discusses the significant legislation
passed and major appellate decisions issued during the survey period.
I.

LEGISLATION

A. Relaxation of Expenditure Controls and Maximum Class Size
Requirements
Georgia authorizes funding for nineteen instructional programs.' The
State Board of Education annually computes the total funds needed for
direct instructional costs for each program for each local school system.2
For each program, each local school system must "spend a minimum of
[ninety] percent of funds designated for direct instructional costs on the
direct instructional costs of [that] program at the school site in which the
funds were earned."3
These expenditure controls will be relaxed for one year because of the
financial constraints many school systems are facing.4 During the 20032004 school year only, each local school system may spend one hundred
percent of funds designated for direct instructional costs for each
authorized instructional program on one or more of the state-authorized
programs at the system level.' Further, there is "no requirement that
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the school system spend any specific portion of [the] funds at the site
where [the] funds were earned."' Two exceptions to this exception exist.
"Direct instruction[al] funds for the kindergarten early intervention
program, the primary grades early intervention program, the upper
elementary grades early intervention program, the remedial education
program, and the alternative education program shall be expended on
one or more of these programs at the system level . . . ."' But, there is
"no requirement that the school system spend any specific portion" of the
funds for these programs at the site where the funds were earned.'
Similarly, "[elach local school system [must] spend [one hundred] percent
of the funds designated for media center costs" and media materials at
the system level.9 Again, there is no requirement that the funds for
these programs be spent at the site where they were earned.' ° Even
in these areas, staff development funds may be spent on any state
authorized program."
The State Board of Education is required to adopt, for each instructional program, "the maximum number of students [that] may be taught
by a teacher in an instructional period." 2 For funding purposes, the
maximum class size for each program may not exceed ratios established
for each instructional program by more than twenty percent. 3
Further, under the Education Reform Act of 2000, the State Board of
Education was required to lower the maximum class sizes that were in
effect for the 1999-2000 school year "by a proportional amount each
school year so that, beginning with the 2003-2004 school year, [the]
State Board of Education rules are in compliance" with the maximum
4
class size statutory requirements.1
Again, because of financial constraints, these requirements have been
relaxed for one year.'3 The maximum class sizes established by the
State Board of Education for the 2002-2003 school year will be applied
to the fourth through twelfth grades during the 2003-2004 school
year.'6 These maximum class sizes will also apply to kindergarten and
the first through third grades during the 2003-2004 school year, with the

6. Id.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. § 20-2-167.1(a)(2).
Id.
Id. § 20-2-167.1(a)(3).
Id.
Id. § 20-2-167.1(a)(4).
O.C.G.A. § 20-2-182(i) (Supp. 2003).
Id.
Id.
Id. § 20-2-182(k).
Id.
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exception that a kindergarten class may be increased to twenty students
if a paraprofessional is assigned to the class with a certificated
teacher.17 During the 2003-2004 school year, a school system's compliance with maximum class size requirements at each grade level will be
determined by the school system average for that grade level.18
However, no class can exceed the maximum class size applicable to that
class by more than two students. 9

Recruitment of Student-Athletes

B.

Legislation designed to curtail improper recruitment of, and payments
to, student-athletes in Georgia was passed in 2003.20 It is now illegal
to
give, offer, promise, or attempt to give any money or other thing of
value to a student-athlete or member of a student-athlete's immediate
family: (1) [t]o induce, encourage, or reward the student-athlete's
application, enrollment, or attendance at a public or private institution
of postsecondary education in order to have the [student-] athlete
participate in intercollegiate sporting events, contests, exhibitions, or
programs at that institution; or (2) [t]o induce, encourage, or reward
the student-athlete's participation in an intercollegiate sporting event,
contest, exhibition or program.2'
Exceptions to these prohibitions exist. Public or private institutions of
postsecondary education and officers or employees of such institutions,
when acting in accordance with an official written policy of the
institution that is in compliance with the bylaws of the National
Collegiate Athletic Association, are not subject to this law.22 Similarly,
exceptions exist for intercollegiate athletic awards, grants-in-aid and
scholarships, members of the student-athlete's immediate family, and
money or things of value in an annual amount less than $250.
Criminal penalties apply to violators of the student-athlete recruitment and payment provisions. A person who violates the prohibitions
imposed by O.C.G.A. section 20-2-317(b)24 "shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of a high and aggravated nature."25 Additionally, high school

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See O.C.G.A. §§ 20-2-317 to 318 (Supp. 2003).
O.C.G.A. § 20-2-317(b) (Supp. 2003).
Id. § 20-2-317(c)(1).
Id. § 20-2-317(c)(3) to (5).
Id. § 20-2-317(b).
Id.
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student-athletes must receive written notice of the law.26 At the
beginning of each sports season, every high school in Georgia must give
written notice of the provisions of section 20-2-317(b) to each student
who participates in any interscholastic athletic program sponsored by
the school and must provide each student with information concerning
the effect of violating this law."
In addition to criminal penalties for recruiting or paying studentathletes, violators can be subjected to civil actions for damages and
injunctive relief.28 Every Georgia public and private postsecondary
education institution now has the right to bring suit against any person
whose involvement with a student-athlete causes the institution to be
"penalized, disqualified, or suspended" from participating in intercollegiate sports.29 The institution is entitled to recover all damages related
to improper activity.30 These damages include: "loss of scholarships,
loss of television revenue, loss of bowl revenue, and legal and other fees
associated with the investigation of the activity and the representation
of the institution before the sanctioning organizations.""' If the
institution prevails, it also can recover court costs and litigation
expenses, including attorney fees. 2 Any person found liable may also
be enjoined from attending any athletic event sponsored by the
institution and from having any further contact with the institution and
any of the institution's student-athletes or prospective student-athletes.3 3
C.

Salary Increase for Increased Test Scores

Effective July 1, 2004, a tenured teacher, whose students earn a
"significant increase" in average scores on tests selected by the State
Board of Education in a school year following a school year in which the
students were taught by that teacher, is entitled to a five percent
increase in his or her annual state salary.3 4 The State Board must
define the term "significant increase. " 5 The increase in salary for a

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. § 20-2-317(e).
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 20-2-318(b) (Supp. 2003).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 20-2-212.4 (Supp. 2003).
Id.
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significant increase in test scores is supplemental to all other salary
increases.36
D.

Tenure Rights for Teachers

The Education Reform Act of 2000 excluded teachers employed on or
after July 1, 2000 from acquiring rights to continued employment under
the Fair Dismissal Act.3" Effective July 1, 2004, "[a] person who first
became a teacher on or after July 1, 2000, shall acquire rights ...to
continued employment as a teacher" under the Fair Dismissal Act in the
3
same manner as teachers who were employed prior to that date. "
Rape Prevention and PersonalSafety Education Programs
The State Board of Education is required to develop a rape prevention
and personal safety education program and "a program for preventing
39
Local
teen dating violence for grade eight through grade [twelve]."
40
local
However,
boards are not required to implement these programs.
boards
[the]
grade
boards may implement them "at any time and for any
find appropriate."4 ' The state board is required to encourage the
implementation of the programs.42
E.

II.
A.

APPELLATE DECISIONS

Eligibility to Serve on School Board

In Hardin v. Brookins,4 ' the Georgia Supreme Court considered
whether a plea of nolo contendere to a felony charge in another state
disqualified a person from serving on a local board of education.' In
1982, "Brookins pled nolo contendere in Florida to a charge of possession
of ... a controlled substance. Subsequently, [Brookins] moved to
Georgia and, in 1998, was elected to the Seminole County Board of
Education."45 Hardin, a citizen and taxpayer of Seminole County, filed
a quo warranto action challenging Brookins's eligibility to hold office

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
O.C.G.A. § 20-2-942(d) (Supp. 2003).
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 20-2-314 (Supp. 2003).
Id.
Id.
Id.
275 Ga. 477, 569 S.E.2d 511 (2002).
Id. at 478, 569 S.E.2d at 512.
Id. at 477, 569 S.E.2d at 511.
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under O.C.G.A. section 45-2-1(3).46 Under that code section, a person
is ineligible to hold public office if he or she has been convicted in
Georgia, or any other state, of a felony involving moral turpitude if the
offense in that state is also a disqualifying felony in Georgia. 47 This
restored by a
code section applies unless that person's rights have been
48
pardon from the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles.
The trial court denied the writ on the basis of O.C.G.A. section 17-795(c),4 9 which provides that "a nolo plea 'shall not be deemed a plea of
guilty for the purpose of effecting any civil disqualification of [a person]
to hold public office.'" 5 ° Hardin contended on appeal that section 17-795(c) applies only to one who enters a nolo plea in Georgia. According
to Hardin, section 17-7-95(c) did not apply because Brookins was
convicted of a disqualifying felony under the laws of Florida.51
The Georgia Supreme Court disagreed with Hardin and affirmed the
trial court's ruling.5 2 According to the supreme court, the fact that the
events at issue occurred in another state should not control.5" "[T]he
decisive factor is not where the nolo plea was entered, but simply
whether the individual was convicted of a crime which is recognized as
a disqualifying offense under Georgia law."54 The supreme court
therefore determined that the trial court was correct in deciding that
Brookins was not disqualified from office.55
Duty to Consider Employment Decisions

B.

The procedural duties of boards of education in employment matters
were addressed in Grady County Board of Education v. Hickerson.56
The Grady County Board of Education ("Board") terminated the
employment of its superintendent, Hickerson. On review, an independent tribunal concluded that the termination was without cause.5 7
However, "[the Board failed to affirm or reverse the tribunal's decision"
as required by O.C.G.A. section 20-2-940."s Hickerson filed a manda-

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

O.C.G.A. § 17-7-95(c) (1997).
275 Ga. at 477, 569 S.E.2d at 511.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 17-7-95(c) (1997).
275 Ga. at 478, 569 S.E.2d at 511-12 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 17-7-95(c) (1997)).
Id., 569 S.E.2d at 512.
Id.
Id. at 478-79, 569 S.E.2d at 512.
Id. at 479, 569 S.E.2d at 512.
Id.
275 Ga. 580, 571 S.E.2d 391 (2002).
Id. at 580, 571 S.E.2d at 391.
Id. at 580-81, 571 S.E.2d at 391; O.C.G.A. § 20-2-940 (Supp. 2003).
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mus action to force the Board to act on the tribunal's decision. The trial
6
court granted the writ,59 and the supreme court affirmed. " According
to the supreme court, Hickerson was required to exhaust his administra61
The
tive remedies before he could pursue a claim in superior court.
Board could effectively thwart Hickerson from pursuing rights made
available to him by refusing to make a decision. Therefore, the court
held that it was proper for the trial court to order the Board to make a
decision.62
C.

Liability for TransportationCosts

In Schrenko v.DeKalb County School District,' the supreme court
ruled that the State Board of Education was not required to reimburse
local school systems for expenses incurred for transportation costs
arising out of desegregation measures. 64 The DeKalb County School
District filed a mandamus action seeking to compel the State Board of
Education to change its policy for allocating transportation funds to local
school systems and reimburse the school district for its past costs of
transporting students enrolled in its majority to minority ("M-to-M")
transfer and magnet school programs.65 The trial court concluded that
the State had improperly interpreted the student transportation statute
for nearly forty years and "ordered the State to pay $105 million to
"
DeKalb [County] for transportation costs incurred since 1978. 66
The student transportation statute, O.C.G.A. section 20-2-188,
governs the State's allotment of state aid to local school systems for costs
in transporting students to schools.6" Subsection (a) requires the State
Board of Education to calculate the amount of funds that a local system
needs to operate an economical and efficient student transportation
program.69 Subsection (d) describes the "transported students" that the
State may count for the purpose of calculating the local school system's
70
The statute
expense of transporting students to and from school.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
School
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

275 Ga. at 581, 571 S.E.2d at 391.
Id., 571 S.E.2d at 392.
Id., 571 S.E.2d at 391.
Id.
276 Ga. 786, 582 S.E.2d 109 (2003).
Id. at 795-96, 582 S.E.2d at 117.
Id. at 786, 582 S.E.2d at 111-12. These programs were instituted as part of the
District's efforts to desegregate its school system.
Id., 582 S.E.2d at 112.
O.C.G.A. § 20-2-188 (2001).
Id.
Id. § 20-2-188(a).
Id. § 20-2-188(d).
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requires that all students, except handicapped students, must live more
than one and one-half miles from the "school to which they are assigned"
before they are eligible to be counted. 7
The primary issue in Schrenko was the proper interpretation of the
phrase "school to which they are assigned" in subsection (d).72 The
State interpreted the phrase to mean the school within the student's
attendance zone, which is the geographic area that the local school
system draws around each school. Based on this interpretation, the
State adopted a policy that reimbursed local school systems only for the
transportation of students to and from the zone schools. The DeKalb
County school district contended that the phrase meant the school that
the child was actually attending. Under its interpretation, the State
would be required to reimburse the school district for the additional
expense incurred in transporting students in the M-to-M and magnet
school programs. These students often lived considerable distances from
the schools they attended.73
In reversing the trial court's ruling, the supreme court looked to the
legislative intent and history behind statutes relating to school funding
and student transportation laws.74 The court held that the State's
interpretation of "school to which they are assigned" to mean the school
in the student's attendance zone was reasonable. 75 The court noted
that "the State's definition employ[ed] an objective standard for defining
a student's assigned school that can be applied uniformly to all students
in every local school system throughout the State."76 According to the
court,
[i]f "assigned" were defined as "attended," ... state aid for pupil
transportation would depend on each individual's choice of schools, as
well as each local school system's financial ability to offer magnet
schools and other special programs. Given the emphasis in the state
funding statutes on uniformity, economy, and equity in public
education, it [was] highly unlikely that the General Assembly intended
for state officials to disregard the traditional pattern of school
attendance and instead consider each child's actual attendance at the
school of their choice, no matter where it was located ....
Finally,..
[this] decision is consistent with the general deference that courts give
to public officers in determining how to appropriate public funds for
education.... Because our State Constitution and state statutes vest

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
276 Ga. at 786, 582 S.E.2d at 111.
Id. at 786-87, 582 S.E.2d at 111-12.
Id. at 792-93, 582 S.E.2d at 114-15.
Id. at 793, 582 S.E.2d at 115.
Id.
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education officials with broad discretion to operate the public schools
in the best interest of the school children, courts should not interfere
with the actions of these public officials in the area of student
transportation unless they have violated the law or grossly abused
their discretion.77
Status of Board of Education

D.

The issue of the legal status of boards of education was considered in
Foskey v. Vidalia City School.7 ' Foskey sued a nonlegal entity, the
Vidalia City School, for damages she sustained in a motor vehicle
collision that occurred on April 15, 1998, and involved a school bus
operated by the Vidalia City School District. The correct legal entity,
the Vidalia City School District, answered and asserted that the wrong
party had been sued. Foskey amended her complaint purportedly to
correct a misnomer and named the Vidalia City School Board as
defendant. The School District again answered. The School District
denied that the Vidalia City School Board was the correct legal entity.
After the statute of limitation expired, Foskey amended her complaint
again to correct an alleged misnomer.7 9 An order was entered in the
Superior Court of Toombs County dismissing the complaint against the
Vidalia City School District "because the [School District] had never been
substituted as a new party by court order and served within the statute
of limitation." 0 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's order.8 '
In rendering its decision, the court of appeals analyzed the legal status
of boards of education and school districts.8 2
A municipal board of education, unlike the school district which it
manages, is not a body corporate and does not have the capacity to...
be sued. Only if the legislature in creating the Board expressly gave

it the power to sue ... is there an exception. The board of education
is not a political subdivision but is instead the governing body of the

political subdivision.n
The court of appeals determined that the legislature expressly granted
the Vidalia City School Board the power to sue and to be sued.84
Therefore, the court held that the board of education constituted a

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
258 Ga. App. 298, 574 S.E.2d 367 (2002).
Id. at 298, 574 S.E.2d at 369.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 301, 574 S.E.2d at 370.
Id., 574 S.E.2d at 370-71 (citations omitted).
Id. at 301-02, 574 S.E.2d at 371.
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separate legal entity from the school district.85 Foskey did not simply
correct a misnomer when she attempted to amend the complaint to
change the defendant from the Vidalia City School Board to the Vidalia
City School District. 6 Rather, according to the court of appeals, this
change constituted a substitution of parties, which requires a court
order.8 " Because Foskey did not obtain a court order, the Vidalia City
School District was never procedurally made a party to the suit and was
not served prior to the running of the statute of limitation. 8 Therefore,
the court of appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.89
E.

Duty to Issue Teaching Contract

A school system's duty to issue teaching contracts was examined in
Atlanta Public Schools v. Diamond. ° Diamond was notified on March
15, 2002, that her annual teaching contract with the Atlanta Public
Schools ("APS") would not be renewed for the 2002-2003 school year.
Diamond timely requested notification of the reasons for her nonrenewal.
Diamond was not notified of the reasons for the nonrenewal by APS, nor
did APS implement any of the other procedural safeguards set forth in
O.C.G.A. section 20-2-942(b)(2). 9' On May 23, 2002, Diamond demanded that APS issue her a renewal contract because of APS's failure to
comply with section 20-2-942(b)(2). APS did not respond. On June 18,
2002, Diamond sued APS in Fulton County Superior Court asking that
the court order APS to provide her with a contract for the 2002-2003
school year. Following two hearings, the court ordered APS to provide
Diamond with a teaching contract.9 2
On appeal APS argued that Diamond was required to exhaust her
administrative remedies available under sections 20-2-940,20-2-942, and
20-2-1160 before bringing an action in superior court.93 The court of
appeals ruled that Diamond's failure to do so did not bar a direct
proceeding in superior court. 94 The court noted that APS and the local
board of education "preventedDiamond from obtaining a hearing [and]
thereby frustrat[ed] her efforts to exhaust her statutory remedies by
refusing .. . to respond to [Diamond's] March 28 request for such a

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 302, 574 S.E.2d at 371-72.
Id. at 303, 574 S.E.2d at 372.
Id.
Id.
Id.
261 Ga. App. 641, 583 S.E.2d 500 (2003).
O.C.G.A. § 20-2-942(b)(2) (Supp. 2003).
261 Ga. App. at 641-42, 583 S.E.2d at 501-02.
Id. at 643, 583 S.E.2d at 502-03.
Id., 583 S.E.2d at 503.
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hearing."95 Additionally, APS failed to give Diamond an explanation
of the reasons for her nonrenewal, even though such a response was
required by Georgia law. 96 The court of appeals held that the local
board's actions made it futile for Diamond to attempt to exhaust the
administrative remedies made available to her by Georgia law. 7
F

DisruptingPublic Schools
In Pitts v.State,9" the court of appeals examined circumstances that
could give rise to the offense of disrupting a public school.9 9 "[Qin the
morning of December 17, 2001, Pitts and another student of North
Clayton High School engaged in a fistfight just outside the front
entrance of the school."' 00 Other students were arriving at school at
the time of the fight and many students stopped to watch the fight. The
fight was difficult to stop. Approximately four school administrators and
a police officer were needed.10 ' Accordingly, the court of appeals ruled
that Pitts's conviction under O.C.G.A. section 20-2-11811°2 for disrupting a public school was supported by evidence demonstrating his
involvement in the altercation.'
III.

CONCLUSION

Although there were not as many developments in the area of school
law as in years past, the developments during this survey period were
significant. As expected, the law continued to develop with respect to
issues arising out of the Education Reform Act of 2000. All three
branches of state government will certainly be called upon to address
these issues in the future.

95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 260 Ga. App. 274, 581 S.E.2d 306 (2003).
99. Id. at 275, 581 S.E.2d at 307-08.
100. Id., 581 S.E.2d at 308.
101. Id.
102. O.C.G.A. § 20-2-1181 (Supp. 2003).
103. 260 Ga. App. at 275, 581 S.E.2d at 308.
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